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WE SAY WHAT WE MEAN, AND WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY:
THE 1984 AMENDMENTS To SECTIONS 904 AND 905
OF THE LHWCA
On September 28, 1984 Congress amended sections 904' and 9052
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) to comport with what was considered to be "the proper rules
governing contractor and subcontractor liability and immunity." 3 The
amendments to these sections were made largely in response to a recent
United States Supreme Court decision 4 which drastically altered third-
party actions under the Act. The amendments, however, do not deal
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Former section 904 states:
(a) Every employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his
employees of the compensation payable under sections 907, 908, and 909 of
this title. In the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the contractor
shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation to
employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has secured such pay-
ment.
(b) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the
injury.
33 U.S.C. § 904 (1978).
2. Former section 905 states in part:
(a) The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee,
his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or death, except that if an employer fails
to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured
employee, or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may
elect to claim compensation under the chapter, or to maintain an action at law
or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death. In such action
the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the
negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee assumed the risk of his
employment, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the
employee.
33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1978).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 1027, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2734, 2774.
4. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2827 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as WMATA].
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exclusively with the problems created by that case.' The purpose of this
comment is to discuss the reasons for the amendments of sections 904(a)
and 905(a), and the present status of general contractor immunity from
third-party tort actions arising under the Act.
BACKGROUND: THE WMATA CASE
In Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson6
(WMATA), the United States Supreme Court granted a District of
Columbia general contractor immunity from tort suits initiated by its
subcontractors' injured employees. The employees had already received
their workers' compensation remedies from a "wrap-up" policy procured
by the Transit Authority (general contractor) to cover both its own and
the subcontractors' statutory liabilities,7 and were seeking full compen-
sation from the Transit Authority through a third-party tort action.8
The subcontractors had been told by the Transit Authority to reduce
their bids in proportion to the price normally included for the expense
of obtaining workers' compensation insurance, but were advised that if
they thought it necessary they could obtain their own workers' com-
pensation insurance at their own expense. By reducing their bids
5. Two other issues dealt with were the liability of shipbuilders and the viability of
mutual indemnity agreements between employers and vessels. As amended, these sections
now grant shipbuilders exclusive immunity under the Act by prohibiting i) maritime tort
actions initiated directly against the shipbuilders and 2) third-party actions based upon
theories of contractual or tort indemnification or contribution. Also, the new sections
now expressly permit mutual indemnity agreements. See Longshore & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, §§ 4-5, 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1639, 1641 (codified as amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(b),
(c)).
6. 104 S. Ct. 2827 (1984).
7. Although the Transit Authority and the subcontractors were both named insureds
on the policy, the Transit Authority's own employees were covered by virtue of the fact
that the Transit Authority was self-insured. The "wrap-up" policy was purchased mainly
to insure that a subcontractors' employees were covered by an insurance program, to
simplify the Transit Authority's monitoring of such insurance coverage, and to allow
minority subcontractors, unable to afford or qualify for their own workers' compensation
policies, to competitively bid on the project in pursuance of the Transit Authority's
affirmative action program.
8. The LHWCA was applied in the District of Columbia as the workers' compen-
sation act of that jurisdiction at the time the plaintiffs' claims arose. See D.C. Code §§
36-501, 502 (1973). Sections 904 and 905 allow the filing of tort suits against non-employer
third parties. See Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961). The District of
Columbia has since enacted its own workers' compensation statute. See D.C. Code §§
36-303, 304 (1981); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Central Labor Council,
442 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). However, claims
arising prior to the enactment of the District of Columbia statute in 1980 will still be
governed by the LHWCA. See Crum v. General Adjustment Bureau, 738 F.2d 474 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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accordingly, the Court found that the subcontractors had fulfilled their
statutory duty9 to secure compensation for their employees.' 0
In granting the Transit Authority immunity from the third-party
tort suits, the Court used a strained interpretation of Congressional
intent" and a slanted reading of prior jurisprudence 2 to define the
section 905(a) "employer." Specifically, the Court in WMATA stated
that it was "clear that Congress must have meant the term 'employer'
in other sections of the LHWCA to include contractors" and that it
was "reasonable to infer that Congress intended the term 'employer' to
have that same broad meaning in § 5(a)."' 3 Thus, even though the
Transit Authority was not the direct employer, the Court treated it as
an "employer" for purposes of section 905(a) immunity. Having con-
cluded the term "employer" subsumed the term "general contractor,"
and having found that the Transit Authority had fulfilled its statutory
9. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1978).
10. The subcontractors were named insureds on the "wrap-up" policy procured by
the Transit Authority. The Court noted that "WMATA never gave respondents' employers
the opportunity to default on their statutory obligations to secure compensation; WMATA
pre-empted its subcontractors through its unilateral decision to purchase a 'wrap-up' policy
covering all subcontractor employees." WMATA, 104 S. Ct at 2831. Compare this with
the holding in Clanagan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 558 F. Supp.
209 (D.D.C. 1982), in which the opposite conclusion was reached. Clanagan was an earlier
District of Columbia District Court decision involving another tort suit against the Transit
Authority under the same "wrap-up" policy involved in WMATA. In Clanagan, the
Transit Authority's sole liability was held to be the remedies under the LHWCA, and
the court stated that it saw "no reason why, in the present situation where plaintiff
received compensation from the general contractor, a 'third-party' suit could not be brought
against the subcontractor who has contributed nothing towards plaintiff's compensation."
Clanagan, 558 F. Supp. at 212.
11. Our only difficulty in adopting the majority view is that it requires a slightly
strained reading of the word "employer." . . . However, upon reviewing the
use of the term "employer" elsewhere in the Act, we find ample evidence to
infer that Congress intended the term "employer" to include general contractors
as well as direct employers.
WMATA, 104 S. Ct. at 2833.
12. The Court cited three cases supporting the statement "that § 5(a)'s tort immunity
can extend to general contractors, at least when the contractor has fulfilled its respon-
sibilities to secure compensation for subcontractor employees ip accordance with the
requirements of § 4(a)." Id. at 2832. However, the Court failed to point out that the
cases cited also state that the general contractor is not obligated, pursuant to § 904(a),
to obtain workers' compensation insurance where the subcontractor has already done so.
Also, the cited cases state that voluntarily procured insurance will not grant a general
contractor immunity from tort suits. See Johnson v. Bechtel Assoc. Professional Corp.,
717 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom., Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Auth. v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2827 (1984); DiNicola v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 407
A.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381
(D.D.C. 1959).
13. Id. at 2834.
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duty14 to secure compensation for the subcontractors' employees, the
Court granted the immunity.
LHWCA JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR To WMATA
The holding in WMATA was in opposition to established LHWCA
jurisprudence. In two fifth circuit cases involving a subcontractor's em-
ployee's tort suit against the general contractor, the courts held that
the exclusive liability of section 905 does not operate for the benefit of
non-employer third parties. In the first case, Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes,'5
the plaintiff worked for a drilling company which had subcontracted to
drill two oil wells on a fixed platform owned by Pure Oil. Snipes was
injured when he fell from the top of a water tank through a hole in
the platform, which had been caused by the removal of grating. The
court refused to dismiss the third-party tort suit against Pure Oil, stating
that "It]he provisions of § 905 prescribing that the Longshoremen's Act
is the exclusive liability of the employer does not operate for the benefit
of anyone else and certainly not for a third party."'' 6 In the second
case, Bertrand v. Forest Corp.,'7 the decedent worked for a partnership,
in which Forest Oil was a partner, which performed maintenance on
offshore fixed platforms. Bertrand, after being brought to one of Forest
Oil's platforms by helicopter, mysteriously disappeared. The pilot, after
noticing his passenger had been gone for an inordinate amount of time,
searched the entire platform but was unable to locate him. His body
was never recovered. Bertrand's representative filed a tort action against
Forest Oil which was dismissed because as a partner, Forest Oil was
the employer of the decedent. However, in a footnote the court pointed
out that "[tihe right of recovery is limited by Section 905 only as against
the employer; the employee remains free to sue non-employer third
parties for damages."' 8
Prior to WMA TA a general contractor was considered a third party
amenable under the LHWCA to a subcontractor's employees' tort suits
when the subcontractor has secured compensation for the injured em-
ployees. In Probst v. Southern Stevedoring Co.,' 9 the court allowed a
tort suit against the general contractor. The plaintiff in Probst was
employed by a subcontractor who had contracted to perform part of
14. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1978).
15. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
16. Id. at 68.
17. 441 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1971).
18. Id. at 811 n.2.
19. 379 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1967). The court considered the obligation of the general




the preparation and loading of a cargo of grain. He was injured when
he fell through a false deck constructed of plywood sheets supplied by
the general contractor. In allowing the third-party negligence action, the
court pointed out that "[tihe act does not make the general contractor
the 'employer.' It is only the 'employer' who can get under the immunity
umbrella of [section] 905."2 0
The question of when a general contractor is obligated to secure
workers' compensation benefits for subcontractor employees was ad-
dressed in DiNicola v. George Hyman Construction Co. 2 1 In DiNicola,
the plaintiff was employed as a tile setter for a subcontractor. He was
injured when he fell through an open space on a scaffold which had
been partially dismantled by the general contractor's employees. Plaintiff
received workers' compensation benefits from his employer and filed a
third-party negligence action against the general contractor. In allowing
the negligence action, the court approvingly quoted from an earlier case 22
and stated: "The law does not accord to the general contractor the
choice of either carrying workmen's compensation insurance, or sub-
jecting himself to liability for negligence. The law requires him to carry
insurance only if the subcontractor fails to do so."23 Thus, the court
was letting the general contractor know that he is not required to
duplicate coverage of LHWCA benefits, and that such duplication will
not preclude third-party tort actions.
This interpretation of section 905 has been exhibited in cases dating
from 1959 up until the WMATA decision. In Johnson v. Bechtel As-
sociates Professional Corp. ,24 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decision which WMA TA reversed, the court cited DiNicola and Thomas
v. George Hyman Construction Co.2 5 for the proposition that "courts
have allowed a general contractor to invoke the statutory immunity only
when he was legally required to, and did in fact, provide workmen's
compensation insurance." ' 26 The court in DiNicola cited Probst and
Thomas as supporting its refusal to grant the general contractor immanity
from third-party tort suits when the subcontractor had provided com-
pensation payments. The fifth circuit stated in Probst that it "reached
the same conclusion as ' 27 the Thomas case. Thomas was a District of
Columbia District Court case in which a subcontractor's injured em-
20. Id. at 767.
21. 407 A.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
22. Id. at 673 (quoting Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381,
383 (D.D.C. 1959)).
23. Id.
24. 717 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2827 (1984).
25. 173 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959).
26. Johnson, 717 F.2d at 581, rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2827 (1984).
27. Probst, 379 F.2d at 767.
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ployee, who had received compensation benefits from his employer, was
allowed to file a third-party tort action against the general contractor.
The Thomas court stated that:
The law does not accord to the general contractor the choice
of either carrying workmen's compensation insurance, or sub-
jecting himself to liability for negligence. The law requires him
to carry insurance only if the subcontractor fails to do so. In
such a contingency, the general contractor may well be free of
all other liability if he in fact carried such insurance. He may
not, however, voluntarily take out insurance that the law does
not require and thereby secure freedom from liability for neg-
ligence.2"
This line of cases appears not only to withhold immunity from the
general contractor when the subcontractor has secured LHWCA benefits,
but it also hints at the fact that the general contractor might be granted
immunity if he has secured such benefits when the subcontractor has
not.
The Thomas, Probst, DiNicola and Johnson decisions appear to
lead to the conclusion that a general contractor will be granted immunity
only if he was required to secure LHWCA benefits and actually did
so. However, the fifth circuit specifically stated in Probst that it was
not addressing the issue of "what ought to be done if the general
contractor, or general employer, is actually required to pay compensation
benefits to the injured employee of the subcontractor under § 904."1 9
Because this issue has been left open, other courts have reached incon-
sistent results.
In Perry v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc.,30 the court allowed a sub-
contractor's employee to sue a general contractor even though the general
contractor had secured LHWCA benefits for the subcontractor's em-
ployees, and the subcontractor had not. The court allowed the tort suit
against the general contractor under the theory that the plaintiff would
otherwise be deprived of his absolute right to sue third parties.3 Reaching
results similar to those in Perry, the court in Fiore v. Royal Painting
Co.32 allowed a wrongful death action against a general contractor who
had actually begun paying LHWCA benefits to the decedent's widow.
The court cited Probst and Smith v. Chevron Oil Co.33 for the prop-
osition that the LHWCA "did not make the general contractor the
28. Thomas, 173 F. Supp. at 383.
29. Probst, 379 F.2d at 767.
30. 202 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
31. Id. at 702.
32. 398 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
33. 517 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1975).
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employer for the purpose of common law liability" and "that the Act
did not immunize or exclude general contractors from common law
suits." 3 However, in Clanagan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority," the court expressly declined to follow Fiore. The Clanagan
court found that the general contractor had provided compensation
benefits when obligated to do so, and was therefore entitled to section
905 immunity. The plaintiff had been receiving LHWCA benefits from
the same "wrap-up" policy that was involved in WMATA. As will be
seen, the amendments have destroyed the basis of the Clanagan decision,
but they have also answered the issue left open in Probst.
The LHWCA jurisprudence prior to WMATA can be summarized
as follows: (1) The general contractor is liable as a third party when
the subcontractor has secured workers' compensation payments; (2) the
general contractor is not obligated to obtain workers' compensation
insurance if the subcontractor has done so; (3) payment of workers'
compensation benefits by a subcontractor will not preclude a tort suit
against the general contractor; and (4) the general contractor may be
granted immunity, in tort from injured subcontractor employees when




In WMATA the Court interpreted section 905 as granting immunity
to a general contractor when he had secured workers' compensation
benefits for the subcontractor's employees, regardless of whether he was
required to, or did in fact provide workers' compensation benefits to
an injured employee. Congress disagreed with the Court's interpretation
34. Fibre, 398 So. 2d at 864.
35. 558 F.Supp. 209 (D.D.C. 1982).
36. See DiNicola, 407 A.2d at 670; Probst, 379 F.2d at 763; Thomas, 173 F. Supp.
at 381. However, the fifth circuit has recognized that a general contractor will be granted
immunity if, depending on the circumstances, the injured worker meets the requirements
of the borrowed employee doctrine. See Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913, 98 S. Ct. 2253 (1978). In Gaudet, the majority opinion
stated that in determining whether the worker is a borrowed employee the principle focus
should be whether the general contractor exercised direction and control of the worker,
and whether the work performed under the control of the general contractor was of such
duration to allow the worker to evaluate the risks of the work situation and acquiesce
thereto. The court stated that the other factors enumerated in the Ruiz test may be helpful
in the decision of whether or not the worker was a borrowed employee, but should not
be considered essential. See Gaudet, 562 F.2d at 357; see also, Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co.,
413 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1969). Note that this is an entirely different basis of immunity,
as it proceeds under the fiction that at the time of the injury the worker was an employee
of the general contractor.
1985]
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of section 905, and amended the LHWCA to overrule the decision.
Section 904(a) has been amended to read:
Every employer shall be liable for and shall secure the
payment to his employees of the compensation payable under
sections 7, 8, and 9. In the case of an employer who is a
subcontractor, only if such subcontractor fails to secure the
payment of compensation shall the contractor be liable for and
be required to secure the payment of compensation. A subcon-
tractor shall not be deemed to have failed to secure the payment
of compensation if the contractor has provided insurance for
such compensation for the benefit of the subcontractor."
Section 905(a) has been amended by adding: "For purposes of this
section, a contractor shall be deemed the employer of a subcontractor's
employees only if the subcontractor fails to secure the payment of
compensation as required by section 4."3 s The new language in sections
904 and 905 resolves the problems created by WMA TA. The amendments
only allow a general contractor to qualify for section 905's grant of
immunity if he was obligated to secure compensation benefits, and did
in fact provide such benefits. The comments to the House Conference
Report leave no doubt as to the intent behind the amendments:
The Conference substitute, in disapproving WMATA v. John-
son, achieves the following: First, the obligation of the contractor
to secure compensation for the employee of the subcontractor
is a contingent one, which is triggered only upon the failure of
the subcontractor to secure compensation for its own employees.
Second, the contractor remains amendable [sic] to suit by its
subcontractors' employees in those instances where the subcon-
tractor-employer has fulfilled its statutory obligation to secure
compensation for its employees. Third, however, where the sub-
contractor defaults in securing compensation, thus triggering the
contractor's obligation, and the latter fulfills that obligation, the
contractor is deemed an "employer" for purposes of section
5(a) and therefore entitled to immunity from suit by the sub-
contractor's employees. Fourth, if the contractor utilizes a "wrap-
up" insurance policy to provide insurance coverage for the ben-
efit for satisfying the subcontractor's primary obligation to secure
compensation, the contractor still remains amenable to suit by
37. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-426, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1639 (codified as amended
by 33 U.S.C. § 904(a)).
38. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-426, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1639 (codified as amended
by 33 U.S.C. § 905(a)).
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employees of the subcontractor; the contractor does not enjoy
the immunity afforded by Section 5(a) of the Act.
The Conference substitute also provides a special effective
date, so that these amendments apply to pending suits. This will
avoid the dismissal, under WMATA, of third-party suits which
were pending or on appeal on the date of enactment. (Any suit
which has gone to final judgment from which no appeal lies as
of date of enactment would not be subject to the amendments).
WMATA, the conferees believe, does not comport with the
legislative intent of the Act nor its interpretation from 1927
through 1983. The case should not have any precedential effect. 39
The retroactive application of the amendments to sections 904(a) and
905(a) have returned general contractor immunity to its status prior to
the WMATA decision.
The amendments also provided an answer for the issue left open
in Probst. The amendments to Section 905(a) confer upon the general
contractor the status of employer upon the default of the subcontractor
to obtain LHWCA benefits, and if the general contractor has secured
such benefits, he will be granted immunity.4 As can be seen in the
comments to the House Conference Report set out above, the third
intended purpose behind the amendments was to grant immunity to a
general contractor in this limited situation. Thus, Congress has resolved
the question left open in Probst contrary to the Perry and Fiore decisions.
THE MARTIN AND DOUCET CASES
The first case to reach the fifth circuit concerned with the status
of general contractor liability in wake of the 1984 amendments was
Martin v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.41 In Martin the plaintiff worked for
a subcontractor hired to sand and paint fixtures inside a vessel under
construction. She was injured when she fell from a defective ladder left
on the vessel and was receiving LHWCA payments from her employer
when she filed suit against the general contractor. Plaintiff brought suit
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction and only alleged negligence
in her complaint. The district court, applying Mississippi law, granted
summary judgement in favor of the general contractor. On appeal to
the fifth circuit, she argued that her complaint was governed by the
LHWCA not the law of Mississippi. The court agreed, and stated that
the recent amendments "confirmed that [the general contractor] is not
39. H.R. Rep. No. 1027, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2734, 2774.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).
41. 746 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Martin's statutory employer under the LHWCA, and is therefore not
entitled to immunity." ' 42 The district court decision was reversed and
the case remanded.
A later case which interpreted the effect of the 1984 amendments
upon WMATA was Doucet v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 43 In Doucet, the
plaintiff worked as a driller for a subcontractor hired to perform the
drilling operations on a platform in the Gulf of Mexico. He was injured
when he slipped and fell on a stack of casing and he filed suit against
the general contractor alleging that his injuries were caused by a defective
thing in the general contractor's custody.
WMATA was decided after Doucet's injury had occurred but before
his case had come to trial. The district court dismissed Doucet's action
against the general contractor in light of the rule established by WMA TA,
but the case was pending appeal in the fifth circuit when the amendments
were passed. The fifth circuit heard arguments44 regarding the effect of
the amendments on the Doucet case and released a per curium opinion
which reversed and remanded the trial court's decision. The brief opinion
cited Martin and simply stated that "Congress overturned the Wash-
ington Metro holding by an amendment applicable to pending claims
such as Mr. Doucet's.
4 5
The fifth circuit in Martin and Doucet reestablished the rule that
the general contractor is liable as a third-party defendant in a tort action
initiated by a subcontractor's employee when the subcontractor has
provided workers' compensation benefits for the injured employee. 46
42. Id. at 232.
43. Doucet v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 83-0351 (W.D. La. July 30, 1984).
44. Doucet v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 753 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2705 (1985).
45. Id. at 2.
46. The holding in WMATA, if it had been allowed to stand, would have made
general contractor immunity under the LHWCA similar to the immunity granted to general
contractors under Louisiana's compensation statute. See La. R.S. 23:1021-32 (1985). Lou-
isiana's statute grants general contractors immunity from tort suits initiated by subcon-
tractors' employees when the work being performed by the subcontractor is part of the
"trade, business, or occupation" of the general contractor. See Blanchard v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 696 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1983); Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 330 So. 2d 649
(La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 332 (1976); Massey v. Rowan
Drilling Co., 368 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966). This grant of immunity is more commonly
known as the "statutory employer doctrine," and until WMATA, had no recognized
counterpart under the LHWCA. The basic difference between the two grants of immunity
is that WMATA's grant of immunity depended upon the general contractor securing
"back-up" compensation for the subcontractor's employees, whereas Louisiana's workers'
compensation statute only requires that the work being performed be part of the general
contractor's trade, business or occupation, and does not require any affirmative duties
upon the general contractor to qualify for the grant of immunity. Despite these differences,
both grants of immunity effectively closed off a possible source from which a worker




The 1984 amendments to sections 904 and 905 have adopted the
sounder view towards general contractor liability and immunity. 47 Al-
lowing general contractors to be sued as third parties will promote safer
working conditions for subcontractors' employees. General contractors
will not be able to cloak themselves with immunity from injuries caused
by their negligence and at the same time avoid responsibility for the
payment of workers' compensation benefits to a subcontractor's injured
employee, a result which would have been allowed under WMATA.
Instead, general contractors remain liable for injuries to subcontractors'
employees caused by the general contractors' fault, as long as the sub-
contractors have procured workers' compensation payments. Direct li-
ability for their own negligence will give general contractors a strong
economic incentive to correct unsafe worling conditions.
If a general contractor remains liable in a third-party action by the
sucontractor's employee, the burden of compensating work related in-
juries will be placed on the party actually at fault. A grant of immunity
to general contractors, as in WMATA, places liability for all work
related injuries on the individual subcontractors' insurers. 48 The sub-
contractors' operating costs would in turn be increased due to the need
for greater insurance coverage, and this overall increase would be spread
to the general contractor in the form of higher bids. However, a sub-
contractor who has already compensated an employee injured by a
general contractor may have insurance costs which would not be reflected
in his bid. For instance, a subcontractor who has entered into agreements
with a general contractor whose fault leads to a high rate of injuries
may cause future insurance costs for this particular subcontractor to
47. This paper deals with "general contractors" in the abstract meaning of that term.
It should be pointed out that there may often be factual questions as to whether a
particular defendant is in fact a general contractor. This was one of the issues argued
in Doucet. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Doucet v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 84-4536,
slip op. (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 1985). Because of the diversified nature of offshore drilling,
the issue of "who is a general contractor" can present difficult factual questions to
resolve. For example, in an offshore platform setting in which there is a platform owner,
a general drilling contractor, and a general labor contractor, if the general labor contractor
subcontracts out of all or part of the labor requirements, and an employee of one of
the labor contractor's subcontractors gets injured, who is the general contractor for
purposes of the LHWCA?
48. If a wrap-up policy is utilized, as it was in WMATA, no one subcontractor will
be unduly burdened by general contractor negligence. The risk associated with the general
contractor's negligence will only increase the cost of the wrap-up policy, which is shifted
to the general contractor. However, in situations where the subcontractors are required
to secure LHWCA compensation on their own, there is the possibility that general
contractor negligence will be compensated by a subcontractor, thereby increasing their
operating costs while the general contractor and other subcontractors remain unaffected.
1985]
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skyrocket. This higher cost of insurance would be reflected as a higher
bid price, but other subcontractors who have dealt with safe general
contractors will not have the high insurance cost and will therefore be
able to underbid the other subcontractors. The competitiveness of any
given subcontractor would largely be dependent on the record of job
related injuries of his prior general contractors.
General contractors would be able to remain competitive by soliciting
bids and replacing subcontractors whose operating costs have been in-
creased. Through the general contractor's third-party liability, a sub-
contractor's insurer will be able to recoup the amounts it was obligated
to pay because of the general contractor's negligence. This will prevent
subcontractors' insurance premiums from increasing when they are not
at fault, and thereby enable subcontractors with good records of job
related injuries to remain competitive.
Having the general contractor compensate the victim of his negligent
acts spreads the risk of the loss in a more equitable manner. If an
injured employee is not allowed to recover from the party at fault, the
difference between the compensation he has received and the actual
amount of his losses will have to be borne by the worker. Should this
difference prove too much for the worker to bear, the loss may ultimately
fall upon the taxpayers in the form of federal or state compensation
programs. Having the taxpayers compensate these losses would spread
the risk, but the class of taxpayers includes individuals who may not
be the actual beneficaries or users of the product offered by the general
contractor. Even if the worker is capable of bearing the shortfall in
recovery, the risk of a third party's negligence is still placed upon a
party not capable of spreading risk to the ultimate consumer of the
product which led to the loss.
Holding general contractors liable through third-party tort actions
will ultimately spread the loss for all damages caused by the fault of
the general contractor to the ultimate consumer of the product. The
injured employee will have the opportunity to recover the total amount
of his actual damages in such a tort suit, unlike the limited recovery
afforded him under the LHWCA. The amount of tort damages obtained
from the general contractor merely increases his operating expenses,
which are then passed along to the consumer by increasing the price of
the product. In doing so, the consumer who derives the benefits of the
product will also pay for all of the risks associated with its manufacture.
Allowing third-party tort actions against general contractors who
have provided no direct compensation to an injured employee is con-
sistent with the concept of quid pro quo. This concept, which forms
the basis of workers' compensation statutes,"9 involves the employee
49. 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 65.11 (1983).
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giving up the right to sue his employer in exchange for a guaranteed
fixed amount of pay for work related injuries regardless of fault. The
employer in turn agrees to provide a set compensation with the under-
standing that the payments will be the employee's exclusive remedy
against the employer.
If the subcontractor has secured LHWCA benefits for his employees,
an injured employee will receive compensation benefits from his sub-
contractor employer, and in exchange the subcontractor employer is
entitled to immunity. However, under the reasoning of WMATA, the
general contractor who also secures LHWCA benefits for the subcon-
tractor's employees receives the same immunity without having to provide
any compensation to the injured employee. The securing of benefits
which have already been secured are of little value to an injured worker.
It is difficult to explain the granting of immunity to a general contractor
who has provided no tangible benefits in terms of the rationale upon
which workers' compensation was established.
The majority opinion in WMA TA spoke in terms of immunity being
"the reward for securing compensation."1 0 It is perhaps more accurate
to say that immunity is the reward for paying compensation. As has
already been pointed out, the jurisprudence prior to WMATA did not
give general contractors the option of securing compensation benefits,
when not obligated to do so, in order to avoid tort liability to sub-
contractors' employees. 5' Thus, even though section 905 grants immunity
to an employer who "secures" compensation, it should be obvious that
Congress intended that the payments be "secured for and paid to" the
injured employee.
The use of the term "secured" in section 905 raises additional
questions. Upon a subcontractor's failure to secure compensation benefits
for one of his employees, will a general contractor's tendering of com-
pensation benefits amount to securing benefits? Or is something more
required, such as the existence of insurance coverage or qualification as
a self-insured? Although this problem could be dismissed as merely a
matter of semantics, section 905 does give an injured employee whose
"employer" has not "secured" compensation the choice of claiming
compensation under the Act or maintaining an action at law.5 2 This
language implies that Congress intended the securing of benefits to be
something more that mere payment of them.
50. WMATA, 104 S. Ct. at 2833.
51. See DiNicola, 407 A.2d at 670; Probst, 379 F.2d at 763; Thomas, 173 F. Supp.
at 381.
52. See 33 U.S.C § 905(a) which reads in part: "[l]f an employer fails to secure
payment of compensation .. . an injured employee . . .may elect to claim compensation
under the chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages."
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Although the amendments lend certainty to the law, they fail to
provide adequate guidance to general contractors wishing to apply the
law. The amendments make it clear that a general contractor is not
obligated to secure compensation benefits until the subcontractor fails
to do so. However, general contractors who have numerous subcon-
tractors working for them may not be able to determine at any given
moment which subcontractors have fulfilled their statutory obligation to
secure compensation. Since most subcontractors are going to prefer to
maintain insurance coverage, the general contractor will not be able to
qualify for section 905 immunity unless the subcontractor's policy has
lapsed, been canceled, or for some other reason was not in effect when
the injury occurred. Without further guidance from the courts or Con-
gress, general contractors will have to "secure" compensation even though
not required to do so in order to be sure that they can qualify when
given the opportunity. 3
General contractors of course could avoid the expense of securing
compensation for the subcontractors' employees by procuring "wrap-
up" policies covering the subcontractors' statutory duty to secure com-
pensation, thereby unilaterally insuring that the general contractor's sta-
tutory duty will never arise. However, a general contractor may have
little incentive to do this, as it would effectively leave him liable as a
third party in all tort suits filed by a subcontractor's employee alleging
general contractor fault. Thus, a general contractor is left with two
choices: (1) secure compensation for subcontractors' employees when
not obligated to do so in order to qualify for statutory immunity if
given the opportunity, or (2) insure that the subcontractors' statutory
duty to secure compensation is fulfilled by purchasing a "wrap-up"
policy, thereby negating the necessity of the general contractor securing
such compensation.
General contractors opting for the first choice will still be liable in
tort for damages caused by their own fault as long as the subcontractors
have secured compensation. However, in instances in which subcon-
tractors have neglected to secure compensation, general contractors will
be able to qualify for immunity. Those opting for the second choice
will avoid the expense of securing compensation, but will remain liable
for all injuries to the subcontractors' employees caused by the general
53. Insurance policies purchased by general contractors, generally referred to as em-
ployer liability policies, typically allow credits or refunds of premium payments which
reflect the amount of insurance coverage procured by the subcontractors for their own
employees. The general contractor will usually require the subcontractors to present cer-
tificates proving the existence of insurance coverage, which can then be used as proof to
obtain the credits. Thus, even though general contractors may choose to procure insurance
covering LHWCA benefits for their subcontractors' employees, the premiums paid by the
general contractor are adjusted to more accurately reflect the risk being insured.
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contractor's fault. Economical considerations will no doubt affect this
decision.
CONCLUSION
At this time neither Doucet or Ingalls has been reargued at the
district court level, however, there can be little doubt that the Congres-
sional amendments to section 904 and 905 have achieved their purpose.
The WMATA Court's interpretation of section 905 immunity has been
legislatively overruled.14 The amendments make it clear that the general
contractor cannot be considered the employer of a subcontractor's em-
ployee when the subcontractor has fulfilled its statutory obligation under
section 904. By granting a general contractor immunity from the sub-
contractor's -employees' tort suits when the general contractor was ob-
ligated to and did in fact provide LHWCA benefits to those employees,
the amendments have answered the question left open in Probst.
In conclusion, the amendments have, for all practical purposes,
returned the LHWCA to its former status. Now that the Probst issue
has been resolved, a needed clarification in the jurisprudence has been
achieved. Even though some confusion still exists as to what a general
contractor must do in the every day operations of his business to qualify
for section 905 immunity, this author is of the opinion that it is better
to provide an injured worker an opportunity for recovery of his work-
related injuries, which in many cases will remain with him for life, than
to afford industry a method of reducing operating expenses. While the
LHWCA does not always allow an injured worker the opportunity for
100% recovery of his loss, it does afford the class of injured workers
as a whole an equitable modern approach to an age old problem.
Kraig Thomas Strenge
54. See also, Weathersby v. Conoco Oil Co., 752 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1984); Trussell
v. Litton Systems, Inc., 753 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1984).
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